Impact of consensus on appendable-block blockchain for IoT by Lunardi, Roben C. et al.
Impact of consensus on appendable-block blockchain for IoT
Roben C. Lunardi∗
IFRS and PUCRS
Brazil
roben.lunardi@acad.pucrs.br
Regio A. Michelin
CSE, UNSW
Brazil
regio.michelin@unsw.edu.au
Charles V. New
UNISC
Brazil
charlesneu@gmail.com
Avelino F. Zorzo
PUCRS
Brazil
avelino.zorzo@pucrs.br
Salil S. Kanhere
CSE, UNSW
Australia
salil.kanhere@unsw.edu.au
ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) is transforming our physical world
into a complex and dynamic system of connected devices on an
unprecedented scale. Connecting everyday physical objects is creat-
ing new business models, improving processes and reducing costs
and risks. Recently, blockchain technology has received a lot of
attention from the community as a possible solution to overcome
security issues in IoT. However, traditional blockchains (such as
the ones used in Bitcoin and Ethereum) are not well suited to the
resource-constrained nature of IoT devices and also with the large
volume of information that is expected to be generated from typical
IoT deployments. To overcome these issues, several researchers
have presented lightweight instances of blockchains tailored for
IoT. For example, proposing novel data structures based on blocks
with decoupled and appendable data. However, these researchers
did not discuss how the consensus algorithm would impact their
solutions, i.e., the decision of which consensus algorithm would be
better suited was left as an open issue. In this paper, we improved
an appendable-block blockchain framework to support different
consensus algorithms through a modular design. We evaluated the
performance of this improved version in different emulated sce-
narios and studied the impact of varying the number of devices
and transactions and employing different consensus algorithms.
Even adopting different consensus algorithms, results indicate that
the latency to append a new block is less than 161ms (in the more
demanding scenario) and the delay for processing a new transac-
tion is less than 7ms, suggesting that our improved version of the
appendable-block blockchain is efficient and scalable, and thus well
suited for IoT scenarios.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the tight integration of de-
vices that are connected to sense, monitor and control processes
encompassing various application domains, such as smart homes
and smart cities [3]. The IoT is transforming our physical world
into a complex and dynamic system of connected devices on an un-
precedented scale. Also, it is expected that the widespread adoption
of IoT will increase productivity, safety, efficiency and accuracy in
different sectors, such as smart factors, supply chain, and health
care [43].
Despite the expected benefits, IoT systems potentially present
considerable safety and security risks, as they can be used in critical
infrastructures such as energy, smart cities and health care. These
systems are often a primary target for cybernetic attacks since it is
possible to cause significant damage to critical infrastructure and
even human lives. Thereby, IoT brings new challenges of network
management, overhead in computation, data management and secu-
rity requirements that need to be addressed efficiently for the large
and sensitive amount of data being produced by an ever increasing
number of devices, sensors and systems connected together [13].
In recent years, several researchers [30] [41] [18] [11] [36] [40]
have proposed different solutions that use the blockchain tech-
nology in IoT to solve security issues. Some works propose novel
blockchain architectures [18] [11], while others propose innovative
blockchain data management solutions [36] [40]. However, few
blockchain proposals for IoT present a modular framework that
can be adapted in different scenarios or easily changed to support
different consensus algorithms.
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Consequently, existing research has not addressed the follow-
ing key challenges: (i) a blockchain solution that provides a fast
response (few milliseconds) to insert and retrieve data from multi-
ple devices; (ii) investigation into the impact of known blockchain
attacks in IoT environments; and, (iii) deliberation about consensus
algorithms and their impact on the IoT context.
In order to fill this gap, the primary goal of this work, is to
propose a modular lightweight blockchain framework that can
provide a fast response time for insertion of new information and
support different device types of consensus algorithms in the IoT
context.
More, specifically, the paper makes the following key contribu-
tions: (i) a formalization for a modular lightweight blockchain that
can be used in gateway-based IoT architecture; (ii) a discussion
about main security issues in blockchain and how they impact the
proposed blockchain considering an IoT scenario; and, (iii) an evalu-
ation of the SpeedyChain using two different consensus algorithms
to demonstrate its viability in the IoT context.
2 BACKGROUND
Blockchain was introduced by Bitcoin [39] to ensure a resilient and
collaborative solution and to allow transactions between different
peers with non-repudiation and tamper-resistance data [45]. In the
last few years, several blockchain instances have been proposed [4]
with different purposes, such as: Domain Name System [46], Supply
Chain [9], Vehicular Networks [19] [47] , and Smart Grids [2] [27].
To be used in different domains, these blockchain solutions can
consider the usage of different cryptography algorithms, consensus
algorithms, data management and block structures.
In order to help understanding these differences and how they
impact a blockchain, Zorzo et al. [48] categorized blockchain com-
ponents into four layers: Communication, Consensus, Data and
Application. The “Communication" layer represents how the nodes
in a blockchain communicate and exchange information. This layer
defines the communication protocols, P2P architectures, and net-
work infrastructure used by a blockchain.
Additionally, the “Consensus" layer encompasses the mecha-
nisms for validating the candidate blocks before inserting them
into the ledger and broadcasting that to other peers. The consensus
algorithm is required in IoT context since the network is public,
and usually there is no trust among peers.
The “Data" layer presents the blockchain information structure.
This layer specifies the adopted cryptography algorithms, how data
are stored, how the access to these data is performed, and how data
are replicated. Additionally, there are some different approaches
for the data types that are stored in a blockchain.
Moreover, there are different ways to use a blockchain. The “Ap-
plication" layer defines the APIs for using data from a blockchain.
For example, there are different ways to access data [11], to use
coins [39], to generate tokens [24], to execute a distributed appli-
cation [46], to use an identity management [35], to execute smart
contracts [5].
Li et al. [34] presented a discussion and possible solutions to
use blockchain in IoT. They proposed a solution focusing on the
“Communication" layer [48] using P2P architecture that uses amech-
anism called satellite chains, which use validating peers to share
information between these chains. Furthermore, they propose inte-
gration with Hyperledger Fabric [12]. However, they do not present
evaluation of the performance results, nor security analysis of the
proposed solution. Consequently, it is hard to evaluate in which
scenario their work could be applied to.
Boudguiga et al. [11] focused on the “Application" layer of the
blockchain, employing blockchain to perform access control in
the context of IoT. Moreover, they present a discussion about the
application of their proposal in different scenarios in which IoT is
used, such as Smart Homes, Smart Grids, and Industry 4.0. They
also presented an infrastructure based in a Blockchain-as-a-Service
(BaaS) that is able o improve the application performance. However,
their paper does not present practical experiments to support the
evaluation, nor the blockchain data management is considered in
the research.
Focusing on the “Consensus" layer, Feng et al. [23] proposed an
Hierarchical Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus algorithm in order
to solve the scale issues presented by PBFT. The idea consists of
clustering nodes and setting a leader for each cluster. Only these
leaders will perform the consensus. This approach is similar to what
is proposed by gateway-based architectures [18][36]. However, they
do not present the evaluated architecture nor present how they
implemented their solution.
Focusing on the architecture of the “Communication" layer,
Dorri et al. [18] propose a solution where overlays control the ac-
cess to data stored in a blockchain shared among different overlays.
In this architecture, an overlay has enough computing power to
maintain a blockchain and IoT devices are not exposed to common
attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and Dropping
Attack [32].
In a similar architecture, Lunardi et al. [36] proposed the adop-
tion of gateways (limited hardware, however with enough power
to maintain a blockchain). Additionally, they presented a different
solution for the “Data" layer, where they introduced the concept
of appendable blocks, i.e., a block can continue to be appended
with information after it has been inserted into the blockchain.
Also considering the “Data" layer, in a different work, Dorri et
al. [17] proposed deletion of blocks in the blockchain. These two
works [36] [17] can help to reduce the amount of data that is man-
aged by nodes in a blockchain, which is important in environments
that produce large amount of data.
Additionally, a framework called SpeedyChain [38], presents a
blockchain to be used in Smart Cities scenarios. Also, to improve
the “Data" layer, SpeedyChain contains a mechanism to control
the amount of information inside a block (using expiration of the
public key) and a mechanism to detach the payload from the block.
While existing research presented important improvements in
the state of the art, few discussions were presented in relation
to the security analysis of the proposed solutions and how the
“Consensus" layer choice impact the performance of a blockchain for
IoT. Consequently, in the next sections we present some advances
to fill these gaps.
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3 SECURITY ISSUES REGARDING
CONSENSUS ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present a discussion about known attacks that
could be performed on blockchains and analyze their impact in an
IoT setting. In order to analyze these attacks, we classified them
using the stack model proposed by Zorzo et al. [48], as described
in Sec. 2, and arranged the model to different threats in Table 1.
Even though we mention different attacks, regarding this paper, we
focus on the main attacks that compromise the consensus layer, i.e.,
51% Attack, Block-withholding, Bribery Attack, Double Spending,
Finney Attack, Fork-after-withhold, Selfish Mining, Sybil Attack
and Vector76 Attack. We briefly describe those attacks next.
Table 1: Most common security issues for blockchains
Threat Layer Cause
Double Spending Consensus, Data,Application
Concurrency and delay
to insert new transactions
Finney Attack Consensus, Data,Application
Concurrency and
consensus algorithm
Vector76 Attack Consensus, Data,Application
Concurrency, mining process
and consensus algorithm
51% Attack Consensus Consensus algorithm basedon computing power
Selfish Mining Consensus,Communication Fork decision algorithm
Block-withholding Consensus Mining pool rewardmechanism
Fork-after-withhold
(FAW) Consensus
Fork decision and mining
pool reward mechanism
Bribery Attack Consensus Consensus and forkdecision algorithm
Deanonymization Communication,Data
P2P connections and
public key reuse
DDoS Attack Communication Consume target resources
Transaction
Malleability Data
Bitcoin blockchain
transaction id usage
Sybil Attack Consensus,Communication
P2P network and the ability
to create multiple identities
Eclipse Attack Communication Network isolation
Smart Contracts
Vulnerabilities Application
Bad programming practices
and Smart contract errors
Double Spending, Finney, Vector 76%, and Transaction Malleabil-
ity attacks are aimed at spending coins in multiple transactions.
In Double Spending attack [15], a malicious user sends multiple
transactions to reachable peers in order to spend the same coin
more than once. Alternatively, Finney attack [15] consists of a
dishonest miner holding a pre-mined block, and spending the same
coin that is used in a transaction of the pre-mined block. Combining
these two attacks, Vector 76% attack [15] consists of requesting
to withdraw the value of a transaction that was confirmed and
sending the same value to another transaction, exploring the fork
resolution algorithm (generating conflict in the longest chain).
Many proposals that adopt blockchain in IoT scenarios [34] [11]
[18] [36] [38] do not use cryptocurrencies. Consequently, Dou-
ble spending, Finney, and Vector 76 attacks are not attractive for
malicious users. For example, in the case of SpeedyChain [38],
an appendable-block blockchain, these attacks do not represent a
threat as sending multiple transactions with the same timestamp,
signature, and information will be discarded in case of collision or
in case of incorrect order, the transaction will be discarded.
There are different attacks that explores vulnerabilities in the
miningmechanism of Proof-of-Work (consensus algorithm), such as
51%, Selfish Mining, Block-Withholding, Fork-After-Withholding,
and Bribery attacks. The 51% attack consists of a malicious user
controlling more than 50% of network processing power, thus this
user could rewrite the blockchain blocks and define the blockchain
behavior [26]. Similarly, Selfish Mining attack consists of a mali-
cious user (or a pool), keeping own mined blocks private until its
chain reach a longer length than the main blockchain. As per the
fork rule, the attacker chain will now become the main chain [21].
Block-Withholding happens when a malicious miner - which is
participating in a mining pool - finds a valid hash value and sends it
directly to the blockchain network, thus avoiding division of the re-
ward for mining the block [6]. Similarly, in Fork-After-Withhold
(FAW) a malicious miner holds the block until another miner (from
the same pool) identifies a block. Then, the malicious miner sends
its block, forcing the pool to generate a fork (this block could be sent
do multiples pool in order to increase its reward) [33]. Bribery at-
tack [10] consists of a malicious user exploring the mining power
of different nodes (through financial incentives) to include con-
flicting transactions in the blockchain (e.g., can be used to force
a Double Spending). Sybil attack relies on a malicious node as-
suming multiples identities in the network with the ultimate goal
of influencing the network [20]. The Eclipse attack consists of a
malicious user aiming to monopolize the incoming and outgoing
connections of a victim, thus isolating the victim from the main
blockchain network [29].
51%, Selfish Mining, Block-Withholding, FAW and Bribery at-
tacks are based on strategies adopted by PoW (Proof-of-Work) con-
sensus algorithms. Consequently, choosing a solution for IoT that
use a different consensus algorithm (e.g., PBFT) can help to avoid
these kind of attacks. A key aspect to be considered is related to
the hardware constraints in IoT devices, such as computing power,
memory, and storage. In order to solve these issues, we proposed
(see Section 4.3.4) and evaluated (see Section 5) in this paper the
use of two different consensus algorithms for IoT environments.
4 APPENDABLE-BLOCK BLOCKCHAIN IN
IOT
In this section, we present the fundamental concepts of a blockchain
architecture that underpins our proposed framework.
The proposed framework was designed using a layer-based IoT
architecture [31] - similar to that is adopted in Lunardi et al. [36],
Dorri et al. [18] and Michelin et al. [38] - that is composed by: (i)
devices (D in Fig. 1) in the Perception Layer; (ii) Gateways (G) in
the Transportation Layer; and (iii) Service Providers (SP) in the
Application Layer. Therefore, each device can produce information
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and send to the gateways to append data to its own block. Conse-
quently, devices can keep producing and appending information
into blockchain independently to the other devices operations. Ser-
vice Providers can access the information from a device (that it is
stored in the blockchain) through the gateways.
D
G
SP
Perception Layer
Application Layer
Transportation Layer
N
od
es
Figure 1: Main IoT nodes
It is important to note that this work focuses on the blockchain
that is maintained in the Gateway Level presented in the IoT ar-
chitecture (Fig. 1). Also, it is important to note that this work uses
concepts that were presented in other works [36] [38], but adapted
them for a more dynamic scenario using a modular blockchain.
Consequently, consensus algorithms can be used based on each
IoT requirement. Moreover, the proposed solution was designed to
maintain the integrity and availability of the data collected from
different sensors/devices for both audition and control (by an appli-
cation or based on predefined rules), based on predefined policies for
each device (in the Device Level). The proposed solution provides
an API to applications for internal (e.g.: logs, alerts, and logistics)
or external usage (e.g. providing APIs for partners applications).
4.1 Architecture
Let N = {N1, ..., Nn} be the set of n nodes in the system with public-
private key pairs (NPKi, NSKi). Also, consider that these nodes can
have different roles in the architecture. Consequently, this system
is composed by d devices, where D = {D1, ..., Dd}, that usually
produce information and could be controlled remotely; g gateways,
where G = {G1, ..., Gg}, that manage the access to information in a
blockchain; not limited to this, different kind of nodes are supported
such as s service providers SP = {SP1, ..., SPs}. Therefore, Ni = {D,
G, SP}. Assume that all nodes in N can use the same cryptography
algorithms. Moreover, everyNPKi should be different and accessible
by any participant in this system. Also, assume that a key pair
(public and secret keys) from a device will be represented as (DPKj,
DSKj) and a key pair from gateway will be represented as (GPKh,
GSKh). Consider that each device in D (Devices Level) should be
connected to a gateway in G (Gateway Level) through different
(wired or wireless) network devices (Network Level). Additionally,
the gateways are responsible to manage the device access and
provide an API that allows to manage the blockchain.
4.2 Blockchain Definition
Based on the IoT architecture presented in Fig. 1, the blockchain
will be maintained by gateways in G (Gateway Level in Fig. 1). To
ensure that every participant can access any NPKi (e.g., DPKj or
GPKh) and information stored in a Gateway was not tampered with,
let a blockchain B = {B1, ..., Bb} be a set of b blocks. Each Bk has a
pair of different information (BHk, BLk), where BHk is responsible
to maintain the block header of Bk and the BLk stores the block
ledger, i.e., the set of transactions of Bk as shown in details in Fig. 2.
BH1
BL1
B1 HashBH1
HashBHk 1SigGj Info1
ALt
BH2
BL2
BHk
BLk
BHb
BLb
HashBHk-1 k
NPKiTimek Polk
Expk
HashT1 2SigGj Info2
T1
T2
HashTt-1 tSigGj InfotTt
SignDt GPSt Datat TTimet
BLk
BHk
Bb
HashTm-1 mSigGj InfomTm
Figure 2: Main blockchain components.
Therefore, BHk is composed by (HashBHk-1, k, Timek, Expk, Polk,
NPKi), where
HashBHk-1 =
{
0 , when k = 1
hash digest of BHk-1 , when k ≥ 2
where hash digest is obtained through a hash function, i.e.,HashBHk-1
contains the hash digest of previous block header (or zero when
it is the first block); k is equal to the index of the block Bk in the
blockchain; Timek is the timestamp from when the block was gener-
ated; Expk presents the threshold time to insert a new transaction in
its block ledger, for example, after this time a device should create a
new key pair (NPK, NSK) and create a new block; Polk presents the
access policy that the device has to attend; and NPKj is the node
public key. It is important to mention that every node - independent
of its type - should have a block in B, composed of at least a block
header, and every NPK should be available in the blockchain.
Let BLk={T1, ..., Tt} be the set of t transactions on the block ledger
of the block Bk. Tm is composed by (HashTm-1, m, SigGm, Infom),
where
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HashTm-1 =
{
hash digest of BHk , whenm = 1
hash digest of Tm-1 , whenm ≥ 2
where the HashTm-1 contains the hash of the previous transaction
(or the hash of its block header when it is the first transaction of the
block ledger); m is equal to the index of the transaction Tm in the
block ledger BLk; SigGm represents the result of the cryptography
using the GPKh to sign Infom.
The Infom can be different for each type of node. Devices provide
a set of information (SigDm, ALm,GPSm, Datam, TTimem), where
ALm is the access level required to access the information from
outside of the blockchain that is defined by the device Dj, while the
SigDm represents the signature of (ALm,GPSm,Datam, and TTimem)
usingDPKj, whereGPSm represents the global position of the device
(when it is available), while Datam is the data collected/set from/to
device Dj and TTimem is the timestamp when the Datam was gen-
erated/set. It is important to note that Datam could be formatted
differently depending on the device. For example, it could store a
single read of a sensor (an integer type) or a set of information,
encrypted or not, depending on the configuration established in
the API level.
4.3 Main Operations
Themain operations that can be performed in the proposed blockchain
are: appending blocks, appending transactions, key update and con-
sensus algorithm. They are detailed in the next subsections.
4.3.1 Appending blocks. Insertion of a new block Bk in blockchain
B is started by a gateway (present in Gateway level) with the objec-
tive to include a new node (Ni) public key (NPKi). This algorithm
is performed every time that a node Ni requests a connection and
its Public Key (NPKi) is not present in the blockchain (line 1 in
Algorithm 1).
After verifying that a NPKi is not present in the blockchain, the
gateway should send this new public key to perform a consensus
to insert the new block (line 2). It is important to note that the
consensus is performed by a Leader elected in the blockchain (see
details in Sec. 4.3.4).
Algorithm 1 Insertion of new blocks in the blockchain
Require: Connection request and requester NPK i
1: if NPK i is not present in any BHj then
2: sendBlockToConsensus(NPK i)
3: end if
4.3.2 Appending transaction. Every time a node Ni produces new
information Infom to be inserted in the blockchain, it has to com-
municate to a gateway to append the transaction to its block ledger
BLi. This operation is performed only if the node public key (NPKi)
is present in a block header BHi from blockchain B (line 1 in Algo-
rithm 2). When, a gateway receives a new information Infom, the
digital signature SigDm present in Infom should be validated (lines
2 and 3) using the public key NPKi.
After the validation of the signature, the gateway performs the
encapsulation of the new transaction, setting: the hash of the pre-
vious transaction HashTm-1 (line 6), the index of the transaction
(based on the last transaction) m (line 7), and the digital signature
from the gateway that is processing the transaction SigGm (line 8)
using its secret key GSKh.
After that, the gateway creates the new transaction Tm (line 9),
and the transaction can be broadcast to the other gateways (line
10).
Algorithm 2 Appending new transactions into the block ledger
Require: In f om and device NPK i
1: if NPK i is present in any BH j then
2: result ← verifySign(NPK i, In f om)
3: if result is true then
4: b ← blockIndex(B,NPK i)
5: t ← lastTransaction(BLb)
6: HashTm-1 ← hash(T t)
7: m ← t + 1
8: SiдGm ← sign(GSKh, In f om)
9: Tm ← {HashTm-1,m, SiдGm, In f om}
10: broadcast(Tm,BHb)
11: end if
12: end if
4.3.3 Key Update. Anytime that a gateway receives a transaction
with its timestamp TTimem with a higher value than the expiration
time present in the origin node Ni expiration time Expk the gateway
will execute the key update algorithm (Algorithm 3). Also, the node
Ni can send to the gateway a request to update its public key NPKi’.
In both situations, a gateway will request the node Ni its new
public keyNPKi’ (line 1 in the Algorithm 3). After the key validation
(e.g., if the key is not already in the blockchain), the gateway will
append a new block into the blockchain with the new NPKi’ from
node Ni (line 3).
In order to append a new block, a gateway will use Algorithm 1
presented previously. Consequently, each node will receive a new
block with the new public key NPKi’ of the node Ni.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for key update
Require: TTimem ≥ Expk or requested by node N i
1: NPK i ′ ← requestNewKey(NPK i)
2: if NPK i ′ is valid then
3: appendBlock(NPK i ′) {see Algorithm 1}
4: end if
4.3.4 Consensus. Usually, a blockchain was designed to allow the
adoption of different consensus algorithms. Before discussing dif-
ferent consensus algorithms, first we need to present what is a
valid block or transaction. For a transaction to be considered valid,
it should have a NPKi that is already in the blockchain, a valid
signature (based on the data transmitted and NPKi), and a TTimem
lower than its Expk (present in the block header) to ensure that no
transactions are inserted in an expired block. Moreover, to ensure
that a block header is valid: (i) the gateways should agree that a new
node NPKi can be part of the blockchain B; (ii) the access policy
Polk for this node NPKi should be defined; (iii) the Expk should be
calculated to avoid a large block in size. In this work we assume that
Mobiquitous2019, Nov 2019, Houston, USA Lunardi et al.
this validation is performed by the gateways through predefined
rules.
Currently, there are different consensus algorithms used by
blockchains, such as: Proof-of-Work (PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS),
Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (PBFT), Federated Byzantine Agreement
(FBA) or delegated Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (dBFT). Furthermore,
it is not possible to define a single solution that will perform better
than others for any scenario.
Two different consensus algorithms are proposed, but not limited
to them : (i) validation based on a specific number of witness, where
every block should be signed by at least a predefined number of
witness; and (ii) adapted PBFT algorithm, where more than 2/3
of the active gateways should validate and sign the block. Both
consensus algorithms could be summarized in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Generic consensus algorithm
Require: receive a NPK i to perform consensus
1: b ← lastIndex(B)
2: HashBHk-1 ← hash(BHb)
3: k ← b + 1
4: Timek ← getTime()
5: Expk ← defineExp()
6: Polk ← setPolicy()
7: BHk ← {HashBHk-1,k,Timek,Expk, Polk,NPK i}
8: consensusResponses ← performConsensus(BHk)
9: if consensusResponses > minimumResponses then
10: broadcast(BHk)
11: end if
In order to encapsulate the new block Bk, every information from
the block header BHk is set, such as the hash of the previous block
header BHb (line 2), block index k (line 3), the timestamp using
the time of block creation Timek (line 4), an expiration time Expk
to control the validity of the block (line 5), and the access policy
Polk that the new node is submitted to (line 6 in Algorithm 4). It is
important to note that both Expk and Polk are defined at API level.
After the block header is created, the consensus is performed (line
7). It is important to note that the consensus is performed only by
gateway nodes. After the consensus is performed and it receives
more than the minimum responses for each consensus algorithm,
the new block is broadcast to the peers (line 10).
We presented a simplified version of consensus algorithm to rep-
resent both PBFT and Witness-based consensus algorithms. How-
ever, we intend to evaluate other consensus algorithms in a future
work, such as dBFT and FBA.
Next section presents a discussion about overhead introduced by
consensus algorithms in the improved appendable-block blockchain.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed blockchain
in IoT scenarios, the CORE emulator platform [1] was used. The
evaluation was run on a VMware Fusion 8.5.10 with 6 processors
and 12GB of RAM on an Intel i7@2.8Ghz and 16GB of RAM. We per-
formed the evaluation using 10 gateways, where each gateway runs
in a container based-virtualized machine; in 9 different scenarios
(as presented in Table 2) using 100, 500 and 1000 devices connected
through theses gateways (10, 50 and 100 per gateway) and 100, 500
and 1,000 transactions per device (e.g., 1,000,000 transactions in
Scenario I). All times presented in Table 2 represent the median
time considering the whole execution in all gateways.
The Witness-based consensus was used as a baseline in terms
of time to append blocks and information. As expected, it can be
observed in Table. 2 that varying the consensus algorithm has
impact in the performance in the task to achieve consensus on
inserting a block (used to insert block header with public key of
each device). For example, in Scenario A, witness-based consensus
takes 58.20ms to achieve the consensus against 102.82ms using
PBFT and in Scenario I (scenario with highest number of devices
and transactions), witness-based consensus takes 72.47ms against
160.35ms using PBFT (more than twice the time). However, witness-
based consensus is more likely to be affected by different attacks
(e.g., Eclipse and Sybil attacks) in comparison to PBFT.
In the other blockchain operations - for instance, time to add
a new block in the leader gateway (gateway that started the con-
sensus), as well as the time to update the blockchain, to append
a new transaction in a gateway (where devices are connected to)
and to update the blockchain with the new transaction - presented
few or no impact using both consensus algorithms. However, the
number of transactions and nodes influenced in the processing time
to append a transaction in the most demanding scenario (Scenario
I) takes less than 7ms to both append the transaction (4.28ms in
Witness-based and 4.55ms in PBFT) and to update a new transac-
tion in the other gateways (2.33ms in Witness-based and 2.39ms in
PBFT).
Additionally, it can be observed that growing the number of
transactions (overload of processing in gateways) has more impact
than the number of devices that a gateway is handling. For example,
scenario D has half of transactions and 5 times more nodes than C,
but takes almost the same time to reach the consensus for a block.
Differently, scenario F has half of nodes and 5 times more transac-
tions than scenario G, resulting in F spending around 3% more time
to achieve the consensus than G. Fig. 3 presents a comparison of
the time to achieve consensus of a block in different scenarios.
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Figure 3: Time for block consensus
As a comparison, Bitcoin network has around 10,000 [7] active
nodes in a 24-hour slice, consequently, the experiment in Scenario
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Table 2: Performance Evaluation
A B C D E F G H I
Devices per Gw 10 10 10 50 50 50 100 100 100
Transactions per Device 100 500 1,000 100 500 1,000 100 500 1,000
Total of Devices’ Blocks 100 100 100 500 500 500 1,000 1,000 1,000
Total of Transactions 10,000 50,000 100,000 50,000 250,000 500,000 100,000 500,000 1,000,000
Block Consensus (Witness) 58.20ms 64.01ms 65.25ms 64.51ms 71.02ms 71.73ms 69.13ms 72.47ms 79.22ms
Block Consensus (PBFT) 102.82ms 119.53ms 121.68ms 121.98ms 126.56ms 132.37ms 129.14ms 136.86ms 160.35ms
Add Block in Leader (Wit.) 3.72ms 3.56ms 4.42ms 4.66ms 4.82ms 5.81ms 5.33ms 5.95ms 6.28ms
Add Block in Leader (PBFT) 3.40ms 4.45ms 5.16ms 4.21ms 4.87ms 5.88ms 5.29ms 5.93ms 6.52ms
Update Blockchain w/ Block (Wit.) 0.22ms 0.22ms 0.23ms 0.22ms 0.23ms 0.23ms 0.23ms 0.24ms 0.25ms
Update Blockchain w/ Block (PBFT) 0.22ms 0.22ms 0.23ms 0.23ms 0.23ms 0.26ms 0.24ms 0.24ms 0.27ms
Append Transaction in Gw. (Wit.) 2.66ms 2.82ms 2.91ms 3.24ms 3.49ms 3.54ms 3.89ms 4.29ms 4.28ms
Append Transaction in Gw. (PBFT) 2.69ms 2.80ms 2.90ms 3.30ms 3.46ms 4.00ms 3.96ms 4.16ms 4.55ms
Update Blockchain w/ Trans. (Wit.) 0.94ms 1.18ms 1.48ms 1.30ms 1.58ms 1.89ms 1.73ms 2.11ms 2.33ms
Update Blockchain w/ Trans. (PBFT) 0.94ms 1.17ms 1.47ms 1.31ms 1.55ms 2.03ms 1.73ms 2.03ms 2.39ms
I represents approximately 10% of the Bitcoin network. As a com-
parison, Bitcoin has more than 150,000 confirmed transactions per
day [15] with a peak of 490,644 confirmed transaction in a day [8],
which means that the evaluation in Scenario I, at least represents
more than twice the transactions in the Bitcoin blockchain in a day.
A more effective comparison could be made with IOTA [25] - a
blockchain developed for IoT - which has around 8.7 transactions
per second [42]. This means around 750,000 transactions processed
in a day (around 75% of the transactions processed in Scenario I).
Also, it represents that IOTA transaction processing time is around
115ms. Consequently, the transactions processing time in our solu-
tion represents less than 6% of the time that is spent in IOTA - 115ms
in IOTA and 7ms in our solution (4.55ms to append a transaction
in a gateway summed with 2.39ms to update the entire blockchain
using PBFT).
The evaluation performed in this paper presented good results
in the emulated IoT scenarios with different number of devices and
transactions. It is important to note that the code that implements
the proposed blockchain was developed using the Python program-
ming language and a set of libraries. The code is available at GitHub
and could be used to replicate the experiments (details omitted to
the double-blind review). In a future work, we intend to evaluate
the solution in a real IoT scenario, composed by different hardware
with different number of gateways and mission critical devices.
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
In this section, we describe the threats to the validity of the results
presented in the evaluation. The first threat is related to hardware
capability. In this work, we did not present an evaluation with real
IoT devices. However, we used the same cryptography algorithms
and methods than those that were adopted by Lunardi et al. [36] in
their experiments (using real hardware). Consequently, devices us-
ing IoT hardware should be capable to execute the same operations,
but probably with a different performance.
The second threat is related to the architecture adopted and
possible malicious gateways performing an Eclipse attack against
some devices. Although we assumed that a device can connect to
another gateway, we did not discuss this situation in this paper, and
therefore, at the moment, our solution is susceptible to an Eclipse
attack. This specific threat should be better addressed in future
work.
Another threat that can affect the evaluation is the mobility of
nodes. We did not consider in our evaluation the problems that a
mobile device or gateway can produce. Hence, this threat can be
further discussed in future work.
7 CONCLUSION
Industry 4.0 is increasing the number of devices and the intelligence
in these devices. This leads to the need for a data handling that
is able to run in a decentralized scenario and at the same time to
keep its integrity and resilience with a very fast response time
(milliseconds), using consensus algorithms that can be adapted for
IoT scenario. To fulfill this need the proposed blockchain presents
promising results (using both a simplified Witness-based and PBFT
consensus) based on the evaluation performed in Sec. 5.
This paper also presented a modular definition of the proposed
blockchain and its main operations, which is the capability to han-
dle transactions, appending them to an existing block, and still
keep data integrity. Due to this feature, the time to add transac-
tions in a block is kept in a few milliseconds. In comparison to
blockchain such as, the ones used in Bitcoin and IOTA, in the
proposed blockchain time to include a transaction is considerable
lower. Also, due to the proposed modularization, the evaluation was
performed using two different consensus algorithms in 9 different
scenarios.
A security analysis was conducted in order to discuss the most
common attacks that could affect a blockchain consensus layer. It
was observed that malicious gateways could interfere or delay the
transaction inclusion in the blockchain. Thus, leading to an open
issue, i.e., to improve and mitigate attacks such as Eclipse and Sybil.
As future work, we intend to scale the present scenario vary-
ing the number of gateways that are available. As pointed in the
evaluation section, depending on the gateway processing load, the
Mobiquitous2019, Nov 2019, Houston, USA Lunardi et al.
transaction processing time increases. A further discussion should
be performed considering different consensus algorithms.
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